Tag: conditionality mechanism

Why the existing EU instruments have been unable to prevent the “grand corruption”? Why the risk increases significantly with the launch of the Recovery Fund? Piotr Bogdanowicz and Piotr Buras argue that
the prompt use of the rule of law conditionality mechanism is a necessary measure as the EU defends
itself against the exacerbation of “grand corruption” and “authoritarian equilibrium”
that threaten the future of the EU.

This text analyses why the existing EU instruments have been unable to prevent this phenomenon and why the risk increases significantly with the launch of the Recovery Fund. We present a new rule of law conditionality mechanism adopted by the EU and the circumstances in which it could be used. We show that the situation in Poland meets the criteria of a “serious risk of impact” on EU finances, which is defined in the EU regulation as a sufficient reason to activate the mechanism. Finally, we argue that the prompt use of the rule of law conditionality mechanism is a necessary measure as the EU defends itself against the exacerbation of “grand corruption” and “authoritarian equilibrium” (Daniel Kelemen) that threaten the future of the EU.

Is the new mechanism to protect the rule of law in the EU a revolutionary weapon or paper tiger?

Is the regulation that makes access to European funds conditional on respect for the rule of law and other EU values a revolutionary weapon or paper tiger?